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CRIMINAL LAW
IMPLEMENTING THE OBLIGATION OF ADVOCACY IN REVIEW OF
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
LARRY I. PALMER*
It is generally assumed that there is some rela-
tionship between the United States Supreme
Court's "right to counsel" cases and the expanded
role of appellate courts in criminal law decision-
making.' For instance, the Court's decision requir-
ing appointed counsel on appeal to file a brief before
he seeks withdrawal on the grounds that the appeal
is "without merit", Antders v. California;2 has led
to two kinds of inquiry because of this assumption.
Does Anders define, albeit inadequately, court-
appointed appellate counsel's obligation to his
indigent client?3 Or is Anders an expression of the
Court's previous decisions requiring appointed
counsel at trial' and on the first appeal as of right?5
As to an emerging issue such as when an individual
is entitled to appointed counsel on a discretionary
appeal,' the lines of inquiry generated by the as-
sumption lead to more difficult questions about
the functional relationship of appellate courts and
the wide-spread presence of counsel in the criminal
processY
Despite this widely held assumption, few aca-
demic resources have been expended on systematic
analyses of the constitutional doctrines dealing with
counsel and the role of review8 in the criminal
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A.B. Harvard, 1966; LL.B. Yale, 1969.
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Sibley, a third year student at the Rutgers-Camden
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' H. PACKER, LnMTSr or THE CRinTAL SANcTioN 237
(1968) [hereinafter cited as PAcKER, Lnirrs].
2386 U.S. 738 (1967).
3 Herman, Frivolous Criminal Appeals, 47 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 701 (1973).
4 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).6 Ross v. Moffitt, 483 F. 2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.
granted, 415 U.S. 909, (1974).
See Ross v. Moffitt, 42 U.S.L.W. 3605 (U.S. April
30, 1974) (oral argument).
8 For a pre-Gideon analysis of the counsel problem see
Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Dialogue on the Most Pervasive Right of
the Accused, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1962).
process. When did the Court begin exploring the
possible roles that appointed counsel might play in
the appeals process? Anders is, as will be demon-
strated, one such instance where the justices were
struggling explicitly with the implementations of
its growing body of constitutional doctrines of
counsel and review. There have been few discus-
sions of whether in fact, from the viewpoints of
various Justices, the problem of the right to ap-
pointed counsel on a discretionary appeal, ought
to be viewed as an extension of the doctrines deal-
ing with access to review, the doctrines of counsel
at trial, or a combination of the doctrines. The lack
of such systematic analyses of these cases with a
variety of doctrinal bases is unfortunate at a time
of general debate over judicial administration. Such
debate has led to judicial criticism of the per-
formance of counsel in the criminal process and
suggestions for reform.9
The impetus for the systematic analysis pre-
sented in this article is the recurrence of constitu-
tional issues surrounding counsel in the criminal
process' and the current widespread debate over
judical administration. Part I proposes an inte-
grated theory of the constitutional decisions dealing
with the right to counsel and the review of criminal
convictions. Such an integration assumes that vari-
ous decision-makers in criminal law perform differ-
ent functions. The corollary of this assumption is
that the difference in function should lead to differ-
ent constitutional analyses by appellate courts. To
develop an integrated theory, it will be argued that
those cases dealing directly with the function of
counsel and appellate courts in criminal law must
be analyzed in terms of constitutional principles.
The purpose of such an integrated theory is to
19 See, e.g., Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy:
Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates
Essential to Our System of Justice? 42 FonDnmz L. REv.
227 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Burger, Special Skills];
Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U.
Cnq. L. REv. 1 (1973).
10 See, e g., Fuller v. Oregon, 96 Ore. 457, 504 P.2d
1393, cert. granted, 414 U.S. 1111, aff'd, U.S. , 94
S. Ct. 2116 (1974).
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delineate some of those unique features of modern
criminal adjudication that are viewed as "funda-
mental". Such a demarcation will make more visi-
ble the part criminal adjudication plays in the
"crisis of the courts".
Part II uses the integrated constitutional theory
as a tool for evaluating or assessing the many pro-
posals for reforming courts. To illustrate the utility
of the analysis, two current problems will be dis-
cussed in terms of the integrated analysis developed
in Part I. First, proposals to limit the availability
of one kind of review of a criminal conviction-fed-
eral habeas corpus-will be discussed. In most dis-
cussions these proposals have been viewed as the
problem of determining when criminal litigation
has become final. Second, a variety of proposals to
expedite appellate criminal appeals will be dis-
cussed. These proposals have been viewed as
addressing the problem of "speedy disposition" of
criminal appeals. With an integrated constitutional
theory, however, both problems can be analyzed
and resolved in terms of allocating the resources of
appellate courts and counsel in criminal law deci-
sion-making.
Whether the proposed integrated constitutional
theory or some other is adopted, several new per-
spectives are generated by an integrated approach.
While some avenues of reform are foreclosed be-
cause of the constitutional nature of the principle
jeopardized by reform, many other avenues are
still open. Despite the constitutional overlay on
criminal law decision-making in recent years, state
bodies have more latitude to modify the adminis-
tration of their criminal law than has been gen-
erally assumed. Finally, legal scholars must start
to examine a new legal institution created by con-
stitutional adjudication-counsel for the accused
and the convicted in the criminal process. Under
an integrated approach, the cases dealing with
counsel and review in criminal law should no longer
be seen solely as constitutional opportunities to
protect the "indigent".
I. Tm VAHiETrss oF RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND
AccEss TO REvlEW
The proposed integrated theory proceeds from
the premise that judges, even in their constitutional
decision-making, decide cases in terms of certain
principles and rules." The proposition is congruent
with the recent analysis suggesting that there are
1 See generally Dworkin, A Model of Rules, 35 U.
Cm. L. REv. 14 (1967).
similarities between judicial reasoning in common
law and constitutional cases.i For instance,
judges do not generally develop basic "policies"
of law in deciding common law and constitutional
disputes.i" On the other hand, when the rule of law
employed to decide a common law or constitutional
case is justified by a "principle" of law, the scope
of review is more searching than when the rule is
justified by a policy of law."d While drawing the
distinction between "principles," "rules," and
"policies" is considerably more difficult in consti-
tutional law than in common law doctrines,"5 the
method of analysis based on this distinction helps
to illuminate the function of review in the criminal
process.
Since judges often differ when any "funda-
mental" issue of law is decided, it is hardly sur-
prising that the Justices have had many differences
in recent constitutional cases dealing with the state
criminal process. Under the proposed theory it is
possible to characterize the nature of these differ-
ences in terms of divergent views as to what prin-
ciples or rules should govern the case before the
Court. Given the rapidity of the constitutionaliza-
tion of the criminal process, Justices often agree
with the result or the new rule developed in the
case but feel compelled to write concurring opin-
ions.6 Once the differences among the Justices have
been identified, the proposed theory provides a
method of resolving these conflicts of principles and
rules, at least in the area of the right to counsel and
review of criminal convictions. Essentially the
method of analysis requires that cases that are
identified as containing clear conflicts of principles
should be analyzed as attempts to create new prin-
ciples. If the major import of the case is to illumi-
nate a conflict of principles among the Justices,
these decisions should not be analyzed as contain-
ing particular constitutional rules that must be
followed in solving the problems of judicial ad-
ministration. Rather these decisions are more use-
fully viewed as stating constitutional policies of
fair adjudication that are developed by a particular
kind of appellate court, the Supreme Court of the
United States. The cases dealing with review of
"See generally Wellington, Common Law Rules and
Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudi-
cation, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
13 Id. at 267.
i4 Id. at 269.
15 Id.
16 See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972).
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criminal convictions7 and the role of appointed
counsel on appeal' are examples of basic policy de-
cisions by the Court without a clear articulation of
of underlying constitutional principle.
The theory will help to explain why the overall
impact of the cases dealing with the right to counsel
and review of criminal convictions is an expanded
role for appellate courts in criminal law decision-
making. With such an explanation it becomes ap-
parent that criminal law decision-making may be
an exception to the general rule that appellate
courts do not develop basic legal policies? 9 By
creating more issues for judicial resolution, the
Supreme Court has not usurped the legislative role,
rather the Court's decisions have realigned the in-
stitutional competences of the courts, the legisla-
ture, and other decision-makers. As an explanation
or rationalization of the new role for appellate
courts, the integrated theory becomes useful to
those resolving the problems of judicial administra-
tion.
The integrated approach differs significantly
from recent discussions of the right to counsel in
the criminal process.20 There has been a tendency
to treat the right to counsel cases as one legal doc-
trine to be expanded or constricted in subsequent
decisions. A given decision on the right to counsel
is thus viewed as indicative of a broad trend in
constitutional decision-making. Following this line
of analysis, one expects a decision holding that an
individual is entitled to counsel at a deferred sen-
tencing proceeding to signal the the development
of a constitutional theory of the correctional proc-
ess by the Court.n
A second type of commentary on right to counsel
cases assumes that the instrumental view of law is
the standard of evaluating the Court's decisions.P
17Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963);
Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
'$Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Ents-
minger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967); Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
19 Cf. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitu-
tional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication,
83 YA= L.J. 221 267 (1973).2 See, e.g., Cohen, Sentencing, Probation and the
Rehabilitative Ideal: The View from Mempa v. Rhay, 47
TEX. L. Env. 1 (1968); Van Dyke, Parole Revocation
Hearings in California: The Right to Counsel, 59 CAL.F.
L. REv. 1215 (1971).
21Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128 (1967).
2 See Cohen, Sentencing, Probation and the Rehabili-
tative Ideal: The View from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 Tx L.
REv. 1, 10 n.44 (1968).
1 Van Dyke, Parole Revocation Hearings in Cali-
fornia: The Right to Counsel, 59 CA.rr. L. REv. 1215
The important point of analysis in this type of
commentary is to determine how individuals will
respond to a particular decision to grant or with-
hold counsel. Thus, in discussing whether counsel
is required at parole revocation hearings, one com-
mentator suggests that the courts' subsequent re-
fusal to hold that a parolee is per se entitled to
counsel at a revocation hearing signals the end of
due process.2
The integrated theory proposes a method of
criticism that follows a different line of inquiry. As
to either decision involving the right to counsel,
the integrated analysis seeks first to ascertain if
there is a particular principle dealing with counsel
in the decisions. After determining what the prin-
ciple is, the next line of inquiry is whether the artic-
ulated principle is consistent with the principle
previously articulated in the case law. At a third
level of inquiry, one iight ask if the particular
rule established in the case is in conflict with any
principle articulated in the cases. For example,
both the decision requiring counsel in all deferred
probation revocation proceedings and the de-
cision requiring counsel to be provided in proba-
tion proceedings on a case by case analysis are
consistent with the previously articulated prind-
ples requiring counsel in the criminal process.
While the integrated theory is a legal theory of
due process in criminal law decision-making, the
theory should not be confused with Professor
Packer's Due Process Model. 21 In explaining the
impact of Gideon v. Wainwright,6 which requires
the states to provide counsel for those accused of a
felony, Packer asserts that the opinion "will remain
for a long time the watershed decision in the evolu-
tion of the criminal process." Such a statement
creates the impression that Gideon remains the
analytical starting point for discussions of lawyers
in the criminal process. The proposed theory ac-
cepts Professor Packer's notions that the wide-
spread presence of lawyers has significantly modi-
fied the criminal process. However, the proposed
analysis will start with the principle of constitu-
tional law involved in the Gideon decision. Along
(1971). But see Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist
Tradition, 82 YASE L.J. 227 (1972).
24Van Dyke, supra at 1217. This same commentator
suggested that Eldridge Cleaver was forced to remain
in "exile" by the failure of the Court to require pro-
cedural safeguards, including the right to counsel, at
parole revocation hearings.25 PAcEER, Lnmrrs.
28372 U.S. 335 (1963).
27 PACKER, LnmTs at 237.
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with Professor Packer's analysis, the integrated
theory recognizes that a constitutional requirement
of counsel in state criminal processes creates a host
of new legal issues.u The integrated legal theory is
in direct conflict with the notion that to use either
Due Process or Crime Control Models is the
method of resolving these new issues.
Reduced to its essentials, the integrated theory
of counsel and review cases focuses on three prin-
ciples. The Court has explicitly recognized that an
individual accused of a crime is required to have a
lawyer at trial in order to increase the accused's
opportunity to defend against a criminal charge.
This first principle will be referred to as the princi-
ple of an opportunity to defend against the depriva-
tion of liberty. Second, the Court has implicitly
developed a principle that requires that convicted
persons have an opportunity to have another body
determine if the status of "convicted person" is
legitimate. This principle, referred to as the op-
portunity to litigate the legitimacy of state control,
is implicit only because the issue of whether review
of a criminal conviction is required has not been
raised in recent times.29 To relate the first two
2 Packer raises questions about Gideon, some of which
have been subsequently answered by the Court:
In what kinds of criminal prosecutions does the
right to assigned counsel apply-in "serious"
offenses only? If so, what are the criteria of "seri-
ousness"? When does the right to counsel begin
and end? Are the limits the same for assigned
counsel as for privately retained counsel? Loom-
ing up behind these questions are even more por-
tentous ones. Does the effective assistance of
counsel require that the state must provide finan-
cial compensation for the lawyers who serve?
Must provision be made for other expenses of an
effective defense? Id.29 Despite the relatively recent introduction of ap-
pellate review in the United States, a modem constitu-
tional theory without a concept of review of a criminal
conviction is now unthinkable on several counts. Prag-
matically speaking, the Court's own opinions have
created more appellate issues for the lawyers now
constitutionally required to be in the criminal process.
Were there no state criminal appeals, there would be
greater incentives for these lawyers to cast all appellate
issues in terms of constitutional law in order to gain
federal review. Out of self-interest or a concern for
minimizing federal interference with the state criminal
processes, the Court is unlikely to allow states the
option of eliminating all state review of criminal con-
victions. See generally L. OiELD, CamnNAL APPE.rS
(1939); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HAxv. L. REv.
441 (1963); Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a New Equal
Protection, 86 HARv. L. RPv. 1 (1972). While it ap-
pears unlikely at present that any state legislature
would seriously contemplate a policy of no criminal
appeals, it is a theoretical possibility under conventional
analyses in the states' attempt to "ration justice". Cf.
Hazard, Rationing Justice, 8 J. LAW & EcoNoMIcs
(1965).
principles in an integrated approach, a third prin-
ciple should be recognized. That principle is the
obligation of appellate counsel to use the review
procedures available to argue that the conviction is
illegal. This principle will be called the obligation
of advocacy. In furtherance of the principle, the
theory of illegality argued to the appellate court
should be based on the theory of defense employed
by counsel to defend the accused at trial. None of
these three principles necessarily explains all of the
cases on review and counsel since many of these
cases contain rules rather than principles. Rather,
these principles will be used to demonstrate that
these cases can be understood as part of an in-
tegrated modem theory of criminal law decision-
making. Finally, it is not contended that particular
Justices have used this particular integrated theory
in their decisions. It is only contended that they
could in future decisions or that others-state
appellate courts, court administrators, and the
providers of counsel-could use the analysis to re-
solve certain problems of judicial administration.
A. The Opportunity to Defend Against
the Deprivation of Liberty
A decade after Gideon, it is still important to em-
phasize that its doctrinal foundation is found in a
variety of theories of due process. The primary
issue resolved in Gideon is whether the state is
obligated to provide trial counsel for an individual
accused of a "serious crime". Or put another way,
the question is whether some fundamental notion
of "fairness" requires that those accused of a crime
be assisted by counsel. While a unanimous Court
answered the question by placing the obligation of
providing counsel on the states, the variety of the-
ories of due process available to arrive at the result
is amply demonstrated by the three concurring
opinions. 0 All of the divergent methods of reason-
ing to the same result are functions of the particu-
lar Justice's theory of due process. Thus, each
opinion contains an explicit theory of the Supreme
Court's review function in criminal law.
A tendency of some courts and commentators to
merge discussions of Gideon with cases dealing ex-
plicitly with equal protection notions" shifts the
10372 U.S. at 345 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at
347 (Clark, J., concurring); id. at 349 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
" Justice Clark does this explicitly in Anders when he
cites Gideon as one of the principles to which he ad-
heres. 386 U.S. 738, 742 (1967). Apparently the more
accepted "equal protection" analysis used in Anders'
companion, Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967),
allows the dissenters in Anders to concur in Entsminger.
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goal of Gideon to equalizing the plights of the "in-
digent" and "non-indigent" defendant. But such
interpretations ignore the scrupulous avoidance of
any mention of equal protection in the Court's
opinion. 2 In addition, such discussions have con-
fused the due process issue in Gideon with a related
secondary issue involving counsel. Admittedly,
when the authoritative state decision-making body
has decided that retained counsel is allowed, the
state may be required to furnish counsel to the
"indigent". And such a question does raise an issue
of "equal protection" under some analyses. 3 Some
commentators suggest that for "pragmatic reasons"
the due process and, equal protection grounds of
decisions may become unimportant in constitu-
tional decision-making.U However, in determining
which matters are fundamental principles of mod-
em criminal law decision-making, the due process-
equal protection dichotomy is important to under-
standing the divergence and convergence of the
variety of theories utilized in deciding cases.
The recent extension of Gideon to less serious
crimes in Argersinger v. Hamlini5 is illustrative of
both the convergence as to result but divergence as
to the underlying theory of due process. Once again
a unanimous Court, but with three concurring
opinions, held that a state must provide counsel
whenever its processes of adjudication result in an
actual deprivation of liberty.386 The "rule" of Ar-
gersinger is workable from a reviewing court's per-
spective since an allegation of lack of counsel at
trial requires few judicial resources for its resolu-
386 U.S. at 752 (Stewart, Black, and Harlan, con-
curring). See discussion in text pp. 25-27. See also
Strange v. James, 323 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Kan. 1971),
aff'd on other grounds, 407 US. 128 (1972). Cf. Birzon,
Kasanof, Forma, The Right to Counsel and Indigent
Accused in Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction in New York
State, 14 BurrAro L. REv. 428, 432 (1965); Kamisar,
Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of Ameri-
can Criminal Procedure in C nmmw Jusncn nq OuR
Trm 1, 64-81 (1965).
12 Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Over-
ruling, 1963 SuP. CT. Rnv. 211, 245-48.
3 Cf. Wainwright v. Cottle, 477 F. 2d 269 (5th Cir.),
judgment vacated, 414 U.S. 895 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
34 See, e.g., Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal
Protection, 86 HAav. L. Rxv. 1, 41-43 (1972).
407 U.S. 25 (1972).
36 One justification for the Court's peculiar rule is
that it defines the limits of the sixth amendment's
requirement of counsel in "criminal prosecutions".
Such a definitional approach explains, for instance, why
the sixth amendment-fourteenth amendment jury
trial requirement is made operative by the possibility
of six months incarceration, Baldwin v. New York, 399
U.S. 66 (1970), but the counsel requirement depends on
the actual result of trial and sentence.
tion. However, from a trial court's perspective, the
actual rule articulated will lead to several obvious
problems in administration sinceit requires a trial
judge to make a prospective judgment as to what
the sentence will be in a relatively minor crime.
But focusing on the problems of implementing the
Argersinger rule ignores its more significant impact
on unresolved problems of constitutionally requir-
ing appointed lawyers as part of criminal law de-
cision-making. Besides reaffirming the principle of
Gideon as the opportunity, to defend against a
criminal charge, each opinion addresses the prob-
lem of effectuating the new counsel rules. The
tentative guidelines for resolving the problems ap-
pear dependent upon the particular legal theory
employed by each Justice.
All the opinions discuss the variety of ways in
which the legal services required by the Court's
expansion of Gideon can be met. Justice Douglas, in
the lead opinion, suggests that legislative reform
may meet the new demand for lawyers. His sug-
gestion is that "decriminalizing" some petty of-
fenses would decrease the need for lawyers34 To
suggest that "decriminalizing" public drunkenness
or narcotic addiction will decrease the need for
lawyers is somewhat curious. If by decriminaliza-
tion Justice Douglas means that another form of
state process such as an administrative agency
should be used, the need for lawyers has not neces-
sarily been diminished. As a matter of constitu-
tional due process principles, the "civil" processes
of state control that involve the deprivation of
liberty require lawyers in the adjudicative part of
the decision-making.39 Most legislative schemes
involving "civil" commitment already require, that
counsel be appointed.40 It is unlikely that the Court
will allow legislatures to take away counsel or ban
counsel unless the principle of counsel's necessity
when the state deprives the individual of liberty
is to be reexamined. Under existing constitutional
analyses, "decriminalization" should lead to trans-
fer of perhaps non-existing lawyers from the minor
criminal courts to the civil commitment adjudica-
tion. Perhaps Justice Douglas thinks that this civil
adjudication will require less time than minor
1 407 U.S. at 42 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
8 Id. at 38-39 n.9.
39 Cf. In re Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Specht v. Patter-
son, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
4 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3413 (Narcotics Addict Reha-
bilitation Act); CAL. IVFLPAa aNE INSTI=OTuNs
COD- § 5252.1 (West 1954) (alcoholism and mental
illness); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.46 (mental illness)
§§ 392.25, 392.26, 392.32 (tuberculosis), § 396.102(a)




criminal offenses. If so, then some more lawyers are
available.
Another possible legal reform of a judicial nature
to meet the demand for lawyers is to enlarge the
pool of available persons by modification of the
constitutional definition of counsel. In Argersinger
at least three Justices indicated their willingness to
experiment with a constitutional definition of coun-
sel broader than one restricted to members of the
organized bar.' If law students under adequate
faculty and professional supervision can meet the
constitutional standard for counsel in lower courts,
the number of "lawyers" available has been in-
creased.
Rather than expand or experiment with various
constitutional notions of counsel, Chief justice
Burger expressed faith in the ability of the tradi-
tionally organized bar to meet the needs. 2 Without
further guidance from the Court, the Chief Justice
expressed faith that the organized bar could and
would meet the needs generated by an evolving
constitutional standard of counsel. 3
Justice Powell's approach looks directly at
changing the Court's own constitutional analysis
as a possible solution. He attempts to formulate a
rule under an explicitly flexible theory of due
process. 4 Such an analysis allows him to express
doubts, in view of the differing ability of the states
to furnish counsel, about the wisdom of new pro-
phylactic constitutional rules requiring counsel.
For instance, a less rigid analysis might allow the
requirement of counsel for the accused to depend
upon whether the state uses counsel in the particu-
lar proceeding.4 5 Since the efficacy of any new
constitutional rule in terms of maintaining the
purpose of the principle is in doubt, Powell's analy-
sis requires the scrutinizing of each factual situa-
tion to determine if counsel's presence furthers or
hinders the opportunity of individuals to defend
against a deprivation of liberty.46 But since the
41407 U.S. at 40 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by
Stewart and Douglas, J. J.).
4 Id. at 43-44 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
"Id. at 44. See also, Burger, Special Skills.4 Id. at 44 (Powell, J., concurring).
41 Cf. Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a
Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L.
REv. 1001, 1028 (1972).
A flexible due process analysis of whether counsel is
required in summary court martial proceedings was
used by the Ninth Circuit recently. Daigle v. Warner
490 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1974) See also Mills v. Mdunicipal
Ct, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 515 P.2d 273, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1973).
461 would adhere to the principle of due process
that requires fundamental fairness in criminal
state court had tried to formulate the more rigid
constitutional rule that counsel is required if there
was a possibility of six months imprisonment, he
voted to reverse and remand.
Once it is dear that the obligation to provide
counsel is derived from a variety of theories of due
process, the use of different types of analysis for
requiring or withholding counsel at certain non-
trial stages is explicable.
The incompatible positions of some of the jus-
tices in cases holding that counsel is required at
"a critical stage" of the pre-trial process are ex-
amples of a conflict over what is the appropriate
constitutional rule for counsel as opposed to the
appropriate constitutional principle. For example,
a recent case held that counsel was not required
at a photo identification before trial. The major-
ity's analysis started with the assumption that
counsel is required for the accused at certain pre-
trial stages in order to increase his opportunity to
defend against the charge.47 The concurring and
dissenting opinions should be read as different
views as to whether a certain constitutional rule
requiring counsel at a pre-trial stage is necessary
to implement the basic principle of an opportunity
to defend." Not surprisingly, a given Justice may
find himself writing for the majority and some-
times dissenting when the Court is deciding
whether the stage of the investigative process is
a "critical stage" for the purposes of requiring
counsel. A Justice may go so far as to suggest that
his analysis of when counsel is or is not required
keeps a semblance of principled constitutional
adjudication.
49
A more generalized view of some of the right to
counsel cases as constitutional rules rather than
principles has several important consequences for
trials, a principle which I believe encompasses the
right to counsel in petty cases whenever the as-
sistance of counsel is necessary to assure a fair
trial. 407 U.S. 47.
Therefore justice Powell concludes,
I would hold that the right to counsel in petty
offense cases is not absolute but is one to be de-
termined by the trial courts exercising a judicial
discretion on a case by case basis.
If the trial court should conclude that the assist-
ance of counsel is not required in any case, it should
state its reasons so that the issue could be pre-
served for review. Id. at 63.
47 United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
48Id. at 321 (Justice Stewart concurring); id. at 326
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf. State v. Jones - La. -,
284 So. 2d 570 (1973).
49 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (Stewart, J.,
writing for the plurality); cf. Wellington, supra note 12.
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criminal law decision-making. In terms of theories
of decision-making, many of the pre-trial counsel
"rules" are joint legislative-judicial decisions to
control investigative agents. That is, the Court
has explicitly recognized that some of its counsel
rules can be "overruled" or "replaced" by legisla-
tive rules which are as fully effective as the Court's
constitutional rules!50 For example, if a given state
legislature were to provide regulations and the
resources for video tapes of line-ups, then in that
state lineups are not necessarily "critical." 51
Therefore, the line-up might proceed without
counsel in that state.
Another way of demonstrating the consequences
of analyzing the right to counsel cases in terms of
whether they contain principles or rules is to recon-
cile the Court's treatment of these cases under its
constitutional retroactivity doctrine. 2 The prob-
50 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
6 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967).
But see the note of Mr. Justice Fortas, concurring in
part, dissenting in part in Wade. Id. at 262 n.*.
0 The discussion that follows is different from Pro-
fessor Wellington's related analysis of the retroactivity
problem of the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule.
Professor Wellington analyzes the general problem of
retroactivity in terms of "principles" and "policies"
rather than in terms of principles and rules. Professor
Wellington begins this portion of his discussion by
stating:
I should like to examine some of these cases, as if
they were (to the extent that it is possible) common
law decisions. This enables me to put aside questions
of federalism and ltabeas corpus and to test the as-
sertions of the last several pages concerning the
legitimacy of prospective and retroactive overrul-
ing of prior decisions and the relationship thereto
of principles and policies. Id. at 258 (emphasis
added).
The divergence of Wellington's analysis from the one
presented here, however, is more apparent than real.
By his exclusion of habeas corpus and federalism, for
purposes of analytical argument, Wellington has re-
moved that which is most crucial to the constitutional
theory of due process proposed in this article.
I suspect that once we feed back in the problems of
federalism and habeas corpus, the individual Justice's
theory of constitutional principles and rules will become
operative as an explanation of their behavior on the
retroactivity problem in the fourth amendment area.
For instance, how an individual justice voted on the
retroactivity of United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), may be a function of whether the Justice
thought that Katz set forth a new principle of fourth
amendment analysis or was merely a new rule derived
from previously accepted principles of the constitu-
tional analysis of the fourth amendment. The accept-
ance of the principles might have to be tested on a
Justice by Justice basis since the problem of the fourth
amendment's exclusionary rule is a subject of the
Justice's concept of theproper role of the Supreme Court
in state criminal process-the problems of federalism
and habeas corpus. I would venture that a careful
analysis of the late Justice Harlan's approach to the
lem for an integrated theory of the counsel cases
is: why are some counsel cases held retroactive
and others not under the Court's analysis? If we
view the primary constitutional principle of the
counsel cases to be that of the opportunity to
defend against the deprivation of liberty, it is easy
to see that Gideon fits the purpose of protecting
the integrity of the fact-finding process.' Similarly,
the application of a right to counsel to juvenile
adjudication will be viewed as "fundamental" so
as to require retroactive application." However,
the rule requiring counsel at a pre-trial line up
or a pre-trial police interrogation is not applied
retroactively although both rules were in further-
ance of the primary principle. 5 The explanation of
this problem of law and time is that the constitu-
tional rules are not so fundamental that other
decision-makers cannot change the actual effect.
In the Court's own language, the presence of
counsel at trial is "essential to a fair trial." 's
As mentioned before, other decision-makers trying
to meet the burdens of the Court's "critical-stages"
guideline might seek alternative legal remedies for
providing counsel.
A further refinement of this analysis is possible
because some of the pre-trial counsel cases are
held retroactive." All of these cases are "post-
fourth amendment over time might bare some rela-
tionship to his developing theory of due process. Com-
pare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 680 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) with United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573
586 Harlan, J., dissenting). Whether principles and rules
rather than policies and principles actually explain the
differences between the Justices in the fourth amedment
area might be demonstrated by an analysis of the work
of Justices Stewart and White. I will venture a hypoth-
esis that the two Justices take two different principled
approaches to the fourth amendment, even where they
agree on the result. Compare Almeida-Sanchez v.United,
States 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (Stewart, J., for the major-
ity) and United States v. Edwards, - U.S. -, 42
U.S.L.W. 4463 (March 26, 1974) (White, J., for the
Majority) uwth Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 285 (White, J., dissenting) and United
States v. Edwards, - U.S. -, 42 U.S.L.W. 4463, 4466
(March 26, 1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Cf. Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (Stewart, J., for the
majority) and 412 U.S. 291, 297 (White, J., concurring).
OSee, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,
249-50 and n.14-15 (1969).
6 Cf. Ivan v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972)
(holding In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) retro-
active).
55See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967);
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
66 See note 53 supra.
57McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356 (1965) (holding
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) retro-
active); Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968)




indictment" as opposed to "pre-indictment." The
explanation of this further rule of retroactivity is
that once the indictment has come about, the
Court thinks the principle of a fair adjudication
must be protected. To the Court, the state process
has shifted from investigation to adjudication.
Thus, if one has pled guilty-the functional equiv-
alent to an adjudication at trial-without the aid
of counsel, the Court will require retroactive
application of the new rule. 8 It is important to
realize that the retroactivity thus turns on whether
the post-indictment proceeding was enough like
the actual adjudication of guilt rather than whether
the state called the stage an "arraignment" or
"preliminary hearing,"
Essential in this analysis is a determinationthat
the particular stage is enough like adjudication to
be protected by those principles. The holding
that the accused is to be offered counsel at a
revocation hearing under a deferred sentencing
scheme is applied retroactively. 9 In this manner
the Court is defining when the "criminal prosecu-
tion"--the process aimed at depriving the indi-
vidual of his liberty-has ended." Thus, the Court
is defining the end of the adjudicatory phase of
the criminal process rather than starting the be-
ginning of a new constitutional approach to sen-
tencing. The decision on retroactivity now has the
significance of allowing the Court to shift its anal-
ysis of the constitutional necessity of counsel.
Once the defendant has been adjudicated guilty
and is under state control, the Court's analysis of
the need for counsel shifts from the per se rules
to an explicit case by case approach. In contrast
to protecting the individual from a deprivation of
liberty, the Court's most recent due process anal-
ysis of parole and probation recognizes that the
interest to be protected is only that of "conditional
liberty." 61 With only one dissent, the Court held
that an individual is not per se entitled to counsel
at a probation or parole revocation hearing.62
Under such an analysis, the decision to have coun-
sel at a parole or probation revocation hearing is
to be decided on a case by case basis. A due process
analysis is required because from the perspective
of a person on parole or probation-at conditional
liberty--some form of official decision-making
6Id. But see Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
19 McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968) (holding
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) retroactive).
60 Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
61 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, (1973). Mor-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 US. 778 (1973).
takes place when parole or probation is revoked.
Thus, the Court sees that counsel may sometimes
be required to insure the integrity of that legal
decision."8 The Court explicitly did not consider
the situation where an individual, claiming a lack
of funds, was denied counsel when the state allowed
everyone else with the available resources to have
counsel.'A The significance of this type of analysis
is that the states actually have more latitude in
structuring sentencing or dispositional decision-
making processes than trial processes. It may be,
for instance, constitutional to deny everyone,
"rich" and "poor," counsel before the parole
board when it revokes parole if the other resources
of decision-making are deemed adequate. These
other resources are essentially a parole board with
an adequate number of members, an investigative
staff, and a mechanism of reviewing the board's
decisions.6 5 It is also possible to conceive of a sys-
tem of sentencing done by a panel of experts
without lawyers as an initial matter, if a legisla-
ture thought it appropriate and devoted adequate
resources to make the system reasonably func-
tional to its purposes.
But from the Supreme Court's institutional posi-
tion of protecting the essentials of the fair trial or
fair adjudication, the presence or absence of a
lawyer is not the definitive label in constitutional
analysis. Having developed over the years an
analysis using counsel as an operative principle,
an integrated theory of due process allows the
Court to see the limits of its own principles. A
rule of evidence6 or a rule on the order of present-
ing witnessese' may violate the policies of fair
trial because the Court sees the particular state
rules as interferring with the lawyer's ability to
defend the accused. It is also possible that the
Court's notions of fairness in terms of the adversary
system's method of trial adjudication will lead to
the result that a state's requirement that the
63 Id.
1
4 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 783 n.6.
Such a separation of the two issues of due process and
equal protection explains, for instance, Justice Bren-
nan's concurrence in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, and
his joining of the majority in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra.
In Morrissey he states the issue remains open as to
whether counsel must be furnished to the indigent pa-
rolee if the non indigent parolee is allowed counsel. 408
U.S. at 491. See Dobbs v. Wallace, 201 S.E.2d 914
(W. Va. 1974) (failure to appoint counsel to represent
indigent parolees held denial of equal protection where
the state permits parolees to be represented by retained
counsel).
"5 408 U.S. at 484-90.
" Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
67 Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
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defendant give notice of alibi' s will not violate due
process unless the defendant's lawyer is precluded
from a reciprocal right to discover prosecution
evidence in order to defend. 9
Viewing the Court's right to counsel cases pri-
marily in terms of principles and rules that are
related to other policies of fair adjudication may
help to explain why more definitive statements on
what is effective assistance of counsel have not
developed. First, the Court appears committed to
counsel as essential to the opportunity to defend.70
Second, without a functional definition of counsel,
there can be few, if any constitutional rules as to
when counsel has failed to defend adequately.,
The reason that ingenious counsel or sympathetic
courts have been unable to develop the constitu-
tional principles or rules of ineffective counsel may
be because there is really little agreement as to
how the constitutional function of counsel is to
be defined. Or put in terms of decision-making,
it is not clear what is the appropriate forum to
even raise the issue"2 of ineffective assistance of
counsel, not to mention develop the necessary con-
stitutional doctrines. But more important is that
the other constitutional doctrines developed to
protect the notions of criminal law decision-making
may achieve the same functional results as any
proposed ineffective assistance of counsel doc-
trines. Yet in other decisions dealing with access
to review of a conviction, there has been continu-
ous disagreement of the doctrinal origins of the
principles and rules of access of review of a criminal
conviction. But once these cases are analyzed in
terms of the function of review, the conflict can
be resolved consistent with the theory of decision-
making proposed."
'8 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
11 Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
That is, the Court is unwilling to consider Pro-
fessor Hazard's suggestion of making the process fair by
eliminating lawyers for the state. Hazard, Rationing
Justice, 8 J. LAW AND EcoNom.cs 1, 8 (1965) [herein-
after cited as Hazard, Rationing Justice].
1See, e.g., United States v. De Coster, 487 F.2d
1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Beusley v. United States, 14
Can. L. REP. 2427 (6th Cir. January 21,1974); Coles v.
Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
849 (1968); United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166
F.2d 976, 980-81 (7th Cir. 1948); Diggs v. Welsh, 148
F.2d 667 (1945); People v. Washington, 41 Ill. 2d 16,
241 N.E. 425 (1968). See also Johnson v. Vincent, 14
CRx. L. REP. 2425 (S.D.N.Y. January 30, 1974)
(ineffective assistance of appellate counsel).
72See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 55
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
73 A liberty due process analysis of Gideon's sixth and
fourteenth amendment requirements is essential to the
resolution of the emerging issue of the right to proceed
without counsel. Compare People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d
B. Access to Review of a Conviion-Liigating
the Legitimacy of State Control
The Court's own opinions dealing with criminal
appeals suggest that at least one criminal appeal
is constitutionally required. Griffin v. Illinois,74 the
origin of the modem theory of access to review,
contains the analytical conflict that has prevented
a clear recognition of the principle of an oppor-
tunity to litigate the legitimacy of state control.
Justice Black's opinion insists upon equal access
on the part of indigents to review of their convic-
tions 5 Subsequent cases involving the waiver of
filing fees7 6 the screening of appeals," and the
appointment of appellate counsel" were also de-
cided on the basis of equalizing the plight of the
"rich" and the "poor" in the criminal process.
All of these cases restate justice Black's proposi-
tion that the states are not constitutionally re-
quired to provide appellate review of criminal
convictions for anyone, rich or poor 9 It does
appear illogical to insist upon constitutional access
for indigents to something-review of a convic-
tion-that is not constitutionally required for the
rich and the poor alike.
The manner in which the apparent inconsistency
can be resolved is to recognize that there is a con-
stitutional principle that requires that a convicted
individual must have an opportunity to litigate
the legitimacy of state control. The Court's failure
to articulate this principle in the cases dealing with
access may be due to the fact that the Justices have
been unable, even recently, to agree on a doctrinal
448, 499 P.2d 489, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233, (1972) (holding
that there is no constitutional right to defend pro se)
with United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1138
(1972) (Bazelon, C. J., concurring) (holding there
is). See also Faretta v. California, - U.S.._., 94 S. Ct.
1559 (1974) (cert. granted).
74351 U.S. 12 (1956).
78 351 U.S. at 16-20.
7
6 Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
7Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
78 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
79 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 18; Draper v. Wash-
ington, 372 U.S. at 456-500; Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. at 355-58; Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. at 257-58. The
approach is criticized by Justice Harlan who dissents in
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 29 and Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U.S. at 360. The proposition that there is no
constitutional right of appeal is also recited in Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972); Monger v. Florida,
405 U.S. 958 (1972) cert. denied, (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724
(1969).
An opportunity to re-examine the issue of a right of
appeal may be forthcoming. See Ross v. Moffitt, 483
F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 415 U.S. 909
(1974).
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basis for deciding any given access case.81 A variety
of due process and equal protection arguments
have been advanced to explain the result of any
given case."' The failure to clearly establish the
principle on some fourteenth amendment ground
has been of no practical importance to the Court.
But the failure to make the analytical distinctions
required by a recognition of the principle could
have important practical consequences to others
trying to meet the Court's many constitutional
requirements. By analogy, the failure to start with
the principle that every convicted individual is
entitled to review is like confusing the question of
whether everyone is entitled to a lawyer with the
issue of whether the state must provide lawyers
for those without resources to pay for a laywer
within the criminal process.82 Analyzed in terms of
principles, implicit in the access cases is the rule
that a state prosecution must include at least one
opportunity for review of the conviction.
An integral and explicit part of the principle of
litigating the legitimacy of state control is the
requirement of a lawyer's assistance in a criminal
appeal. In Douglas v. California,83 decided the same
day as Gideon, the Court required the states to
provide the convicted person with a lawyer on his
first appeal-as-of-right. Justice Douglas, for the
majority, reasoned that the "poor" convicted per-
son must have as "meaningful" an appeal as the
rich convicted person who could afford and utilize
the services of a lawyer. He reached the result
without any specification as to whether notions of
due process, equal protection, or some combination
of the two required the result.' Once again, it
should be apparent that the poor must be placed
on an equal footing to those with more resources
only because the rich have something that is funda-
mental-review with the assistance of a lawyer.
Making Douglas consistent with Griffn v. 1llinois,
85
the "leading case," under the integrated analysis
requires only a traditional type of reconciliation
of the two cases. In Griffin, Justice Black suggested
80 See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 12 (Black, J.,
writing for the plurality).81Kamisar and Choper, The Right to Counsel in
Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Ob-
servations, 48 Mnuw. L. REv. 1, 7-14 (1963).
See Mitchell v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 349 (6th Cir.
'1973); Ross v. Moffitt, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973),
cert. granted., 415 U.S. 909 (1974).
12 See text supra at 269.
372 U.S. 353 (1963).
4 Id.
85 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
that the equalizing notion means the state courts
have to furnish a transcript unless "other means of
affording adequate appellate review to indigents"
are found.88 After Douglas, it is apparent that those
alternative means do not mean review absent the
participation of a lawyer in the appellate process.
Without reading Griffin and Douglas together to
delineate the underlying principle, the Court's
analysis would appear to allow the states the
option of eliminating lawyers in criminal appeals
for everyone. Under the integrated analysis, the
option does not exist. Rather the integrated anal-
ysis' explicit articulation of the principle makes it
easier to distinguish the problems of access in
criminal law from the problems of access in other
types of legal processes1
More recent attempts to apply the Griffin ra-
tionale are not inconsistent with the above argu-
ment that a criminal prosecution requires some
minimal means of review. In Mayer v. Chicago89
the unanimous Court held that an individual con-
victed and fined under a city ordinance was en-
titled to a record sufficient for access to review.9"
88 351 U.S. at 20.
87 If the issue were ever raised, review of a criminal
conviction would be held to be a "fundamental" aspect
of the criminal process. Note, The Supreme Court, 1962
Term, 77 H v. L. Rxv. 62, 108 (1963). Cf. Texas v.
Pruett, 470 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1972), aff 'd, 414, U.S.
802 (1973). To arrive at such a result, the Court would
need two related theories. One important theoretical
consideration would be the functions appellate courts
should perform in the criminal process. Cf. L. O.nELD,
CammnAL APPROACH (1939). The other consideration
would be a legal theory of access to review of a criminal
conviction. Either something like the Brennan or Har-
lan rationale could be used as a starting point for such
a theory. The Harlan rationale, however, should be pre-
ferred because his theory of due process takes account
of the allocation of judicial and other resources. Fur-
thermore, when faced with the question of whether due
process requires some system of review, Harlan was the
only Justice to articulate a connection between requir-
ing counsel and review of the initial determination. In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 72 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring
and dissenting).
See also Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59
VA. L. R.v. 988, 1028-29, 1028 n.148 (1973).
8 Counsel for the petitioners in Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), were surprised that the Court
decided in their favor on an explicit due process ground.
LaFrance, Constitutional Law Reform for the Poor:
Boddie v. Connecticut, 1971 Dun L.. J 487. See also id.
at 520-21 n.153. See note 80 infra.
9 404 U.S. 189 (1971).90 A leading commentator has suggested that the
more recent Argersinger incarceration-in-fact rule
means the Court might now view Mayer differently. L.
HALL, Y. KAsrsAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. IsRAEL, MODERN
CmRnNAL PxocEDUm, 27 (Supp. Jan. 1973). But such
analysis, fails to distinguish the issues of an opportunity
to defend from access to review.
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However, in Britt v. North Carolina,91 which did
not involve access to review of a criminal convic-
tion, the Court held that the denial of a transcript
of the defendant's first trial that ended in a mis-
trial was justified under the "narrow circum-
stances." While those circumstances were not
sufficiently different from cases where the Court
had required a transcript of a preliminary hearing,12
for the two dissenters, Britt demonstrates the in-
herent difficulties of applying Griffin without a
clear articulation of its basic principles.93
Facing the issue in terms of access to review of
criminal convictions allows for a discussion of this
issue in terms of its limits-the problem of finality
of criminal convictions. Given a process that re-
quires lawyers in the trial and appellate process,
the notion of "challenge" and litigation pervades
the system.4 Yet every legal process must deter-
mine when the litigation has ended. For instance,
deciding when federal habeas corpus relief is avail-
able can be seen in terms of allocating the time of
counsel, the opportunity to defend, and the oppor-
tunity to review the guilt determination in the
state proceedings.95 Despite the uncomfortable-
ness of the suggestion, we must now recognize
Professor Hazard's suggestion that courts, legisla-
tures, and now court administrators, are "ration-
404 U.S. 226 (1972).
92 Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967).
3 As the equality notion of Grifin is expanded from
review stages, broadly defined, the equal protection-
due process dichotomy reappears. When the issue is
whether "indigents" can be jailed for failure to pay fines,
a unanimous court cannot agree on a rationale. Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399
U.S. 40 (1970). The conflict is even more dramatic when
the issue is the applicability or inapplicability of Griffin
to the issue of filing fees to divorce cases. Justice Harlan,
for the majority, in Boddie!v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971), cites and uses Griffin as a case dealing solely
with access to courts and the allocation of judicial re-
sources. Id. at 382. Justice Black, the sole dissenter and
author of Griffin, thought its rationale wholly inappli-
cable to "civil" cases. Id. at 385-86. Concurring,
Justice Douglas reads Griffin as an equal protection
case dealing with a principle of invidious discrimination
based on poverty. Id. at 388. The other concurring
justice, Brennan, prefers a joint due process and equal
protection rationale of Griffin. He holds that a fee re-
quirement for the indigent in a divorce case is a denial
of equal access to the courts. Id. at 390. Cf. Brickman,
Of Arterial Passageways through the Legal Process: The
Right of Universal Access to Courts and Lawyering Ser-
vices, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 595 (1973); Michelman, The
Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to
Protect One's Righ's-Part I, 1973 Duocu L. J. 1153
(1973).94 PAcKmR, Lmnrs at 204-38.
95Schnecldoth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250,
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring); cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973).
ing justice" 11 in terms of particular views of the
competence of counsel at trial or pre-trial stages,
and the ability of an appellate court to review
guilt determination with or without counsel's
active participation.Y7
C. The Principle of Advocacy in Review
of Criminal Convictions
Until Anders v. California9 the Court had man-
aged to avoid explicit discussion of the principle
originating in Gideon in a case purporting to deal
solely with the Griffin lines of cases. As noted
previously, the rule requiring appointed counsel
on appeals, although decided on the same day as
Gideon, relied solely upon Griffin." justice Clark
combined the two lines of cases in Anders in de-
ciding that appointed appellate counsel could not
file a "no merit" letter rather than a brief on the
merits without explicit exposition."0 ' Acting on the
assumption that the convicted person had a law-
yer to defend him because of theprincipleof Gideon,
the Court had implicitly assumed that there might
be an arguable issue for appellate review. This
assumption is reinforced by the Court's require-
ment of appointment of appellate counsel under
the principle of Griffin. But to put these implicit
assumptions into an integrated theory, Anders
should be recognized as establishing a third prin-
ciple of criminal law decision-making. That prin-
ciple is that counsel in a criminal appeal has the
obligation of advocacy. As a new principle, Anders
is the starting point for integrating the functions
of appellate courts and counsel in criminal law.
While the opinion in Anders is replete with refer-
96 Hazard, Rationing Justice, supra note 70.
17 Limiting access to federal review of the volun-
tariness of guilty pleas is apparently dependent on the
assumption that counsel performs his obligation to
defend. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970). The obligation to defend includes, in at least
Justice White's view, the obligation to litigate the vol-
untariness of a confession along the available avenues.
At the time of the plea in question, Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368 (1964), was not the law. Underlying Justice
White's analysis is a further assumption that defense
lawyers will not allow individuals with conceivable legal
defenses (i.e. suppression of a confession that leads to
lack of evidence for the jury to convict) to plead guilty.
If subsequent analysis or research proves White's as-
sumptions erroneous, the present acceptance of guilty
pleas and the bargain model of criminal law. See, e.g.,
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 495 (1971), will be
brought into question. See also discussion in text infra
p. 281.
98 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
99 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
100 386 U.S. at 742-45.
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ences to notions of advocacy for the indigent,''
neither the opinion nor subsequent discussions
clearly articulate that the Court has established a
new principle.
Most discussions of Anders have improperly
assumed that the major issue left open for resolu-
tion after Anders is the definition of a "frivolous
appeal." 102 Such discussions are misguided since
the Court's statement that counsel can request
withdrawal if the claim is "wholly frivolous," 103
is only one rule to implement the more general
principle of advocacy.'
A critical examination of Anders' companion
case, Entsminger v. Iowa,x05 will demonstrate that
establishing the principle of advocacy is Anders'
major innovation. Despite a court order to file a
full record, briefs, and be prepared for oral argu-
ment, counsel simply filed a "clerk's transcript." 106
The state court's short per curiam affirmance of
the conviction was inadequate primarily because
appellate counsel failed to take advantage of the
appellate procedures available.ln After Entsminger
there is no rule that says "clerk's transcript" or
that "no merit letters" are per se unconstitutional.
Rather the constitution prohibits the use of either
procedure in such a way as to inhibit or encourage
appellate counsel to abandon his obligation of
advocacy.3l
Clarifying the underlying principle of Anders is
only the beginning of the appellate courts' job.
But given such clarification, courts should be aware
101386 U.S. at 741-42.
10 Hermann, Frivolous Criminal Appeals, 47 N.Y.
U.L. R v. 701 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hermann,
Frivolous Appeals]; Note, Screening of Criminal Cases in
the Federal Courts of Appeal: Practice and Proposals, 73
CoLum. L. REv. 77 (1973).
10 386 U.S. at 744.
104 Id.
100 386 U.S. 748 (1967).
106 386 U.S. at 750.
107 386 U.S. at 752.
"Is See, e.g., MIsSOURI STAT. ANN., Rules of Criminal
Procedure § 29.01(c) (1969). After Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) was decided, the Missouri
supreme court amended its rules to require appoint-
ment of counsel for indigents who wish to appeal.
Gerard, The Right to Counsel in Missouri: A Limited
Inquiry, into the Factual and Theoretical Underpinnings
ofDouglas v. California, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 463, 464
and n.4 (1965). Under the present rules appointed
appellate counsel is required to submit a brief which
modifies one appellate route available in Missouri be-
fore Douglas and Anders, that of appeal by means of a
motion for a new trial for which no brief is required.
Id. at 465. It is Gerard's thesis generally that the
motion for a new trial procedure did not adequately
provide the indigent appellant with the resources of
counsel.
of the wide range of combinations of rules that
might effectuate the principle. Careful examina-
tion of any proposed rule will reveal wide ramifica-
tions for the appellate courts' relationship to other
institutions. For instance, in formulating a rule to
implement Anders, a court must make judgments
about the general quality of counsel in its jurisdic-
tion. In some specific situations courts might
need to consider in addition the effect of a state-
wide system as compared with other arrangements
for providing legal services to the indigent. 00
Overall, however, the failure of most courts to
see and address issues like those outlined above
has led to some misuses of the Anders principle.
Without critical examination of the appellate
courts, counsel, and the rules of appellate proce-
dure in a given jurisdiction, there may be a tend-
ency of courts and commentators to see contradic-
tions in the law where in fact none exists. Also, a
court may improperly assume that the major issue
left open for resolution after Anders is under what
circumstances can appellate counsel withdrawil °
Armed with an inadequate analysis of Anders,
courts may go beyond constitutional principles in
attempts to deal with the problems of advocacy."
For example, the California courts at one time
went beyond the requirements of advocacy. In In
re Ketchel12 the court required that the defendant
receive a psychiatric examination on the theory
that appellate counsel might use the expert in-
formation to develop a theory of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel at trial.' While the court thought
the spirit of Anters required such a result,"4 it
failed to consider whether its notion of the obliga-
tion of advocacy went beyond any theory of de-
fense offered at trial. 1 5 Anders requires that ap-
pellate counsel, as an advocate, argue every issue
that might be in the record. But the court is in-
correct in assuming that Anders provides guidance
for what are the proper rules of appellate proce-
dure. Given the operation of the California appel-
109 See e.g., N.J. STAr. ANN. § 2A:158A (1971);
Trebach, A Modern Defender System for New Jersey, 12
RUTGERs L. R.v. 289 (1957).
Uo See, e.g., Barber v. State, 471 S.W.2d 814 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971).
m Throughout all of these proposed solutions is the
uneasy feeling that appellate counsel cannot withdraw.
Cf. Doherty, Wolf! Wolf!l-The Ramifications of Frivo-
lous Appeals, 59 J. C=. L.C. & P.S. 1 (1968).
1 68 Cal. 2d 397, 438 P.2d 625, 66 Cal. Rptr. 881
(1968).
I' Id. at 401, 438 P.2d at 628, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
4 Id. at 402, 438 P.2d at 629, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
n5 Id. at 403-06, 438 P.2d 629-31, 66 Cal. Rptr. at
885-87, (dissenting opinion).
[Vol. 65
ADVOCACY IN CONVICTION REVIEW
late courts, the court might legitimately want to
have higher standards than Anders, but those
standards should be stated as such.n"
More recent discussions interpreting Anders in
California have focused on the issue of protecting
effective appeal. In In Re Banks,"7 a state habeas
corpus proceeding, the appellate court held that
the petitioner had been denied his right of "effec-
tive advocacy by appellate counsel." M The case
is a curious one since the petitioner's involvement
in the various state and federal review mechanisms
spanned nearly a ten year period 9 The attempt
to obtain the effective advocacy eventually re-
quired by the court involved three trips to the
United States Supreme Court and numerous re-
quests for appointment of different appellate
counsel.U The Court went on to hold that the
petitioner's constitutional rights had been violated
in his 1962 trial by the prosecution's comments
upon his refusal to take the stand. In deciding to
21See, e.g., In re Smith, 3 Cal. 3d 192,474 P.2d 969,
90 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970) (the kind of arguments an active
appellate advocate could and should make are outlined
in the opinion).
U? 4 Cal. 3d 337, 482 P.2d 215, 93 Cal. Rptr. 591
(1971).
us Id. at 340, 482 P.2d at 217, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
"1 History of the appeals of In re Banks: 1. August
9, 1962 judgment was entered on two counts of robbery
and one count of attempted robbery. Petitioner had
conducted his own defense. 2. Petitioner filed a timely
appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Court-appointed
appellate counsel received several continuances and two
requests from the clerk of the court to file a brief. Fi-
nally, over a year later, a twenty three page brief was
filed. The brief cited only two cases. In 1964 the strong-
est appellate argument was denial of counsel at trial,
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and yet
the case was not cited. Counsel then dropped the case
and wrote to petitioner, but did not send the court a
no-merit letter as required. See In re Nash, 61 Cal.
2d 491, 393 P.2d 405, 39 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1964). 3. Peti-
tioner sought relief in propria persona. The United
States Supreme Court vacated and remanded for con-
sideration in light of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965). Banks v. California, 382 U.S. 420 (1966). 4.
Petitioner requested appointment of different counsel,
but the court of appeals denied his request. It informed
counsel he might brief and present oral argument.
However, Counsel did not submit a brief, or motion,
and did not appear to argue the case. Court of appeals
affirmed. 5. Petitioner sought relief again in propria
persona. The United States Supreme Court vacated
and remanded for reconsideration in light of Chap-
man v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Banks v. Cali-
fornia, 387 U.S. 92 (1967). 6. Court of Appeals again
affirmed. 7. Banks petitioned the United States Su-
preme Court a third time. Certiorari was dismissed for
petitioner's failure to petition the California supreme
court for a hearing. Banks v. California, 395 U.S. 708
(1969). 4 Cal. 3d at 340-42, 341 n.1, 593 n.1, 482 P.2d
at 217-18, 217 n.1, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 593-94.
no Id.
consider the merits in this collateral proceeding,
the court had to decide why its usual remedy of
reinstating the appeal did not apply to the case.
Two factors moved the court to decide the case
on the merits. One factor was "conservation of
scarce judicial resources." The other was the able
advocacy of the newly appointed counsel.V 1 The
court failed, however, to discuss whether its dis-
position of the case would have prevented the
numerous appeals cases at hand or in future cases.
The long range resolutions of the problem of
numerous appeals lies in the California courts'
effective use of the "Anders Brief." It is a brief
required by the Court in Anders, consisting of any
arguable points with citations to the record and
relevant cases that must be filed before counsel
can withdraw.m The California rule of allowing
withdrawal of counsel after a full discussion of all
the issues in the record and deciding to dismiss an
appeal as "frivolous" is the rule used by most
states.
Another solution to numerous appeals is to use
the apparently contradictory rule of not allowing
appointed counsel to withdraw.2 I Those states
forcing counsel to file appellate briefs rather than
"Anders Briefs" may have different views as to
the best allocation of the resources of counsel,
time spent on direct appeal review, and time spent
on collateral review of conviction. Both rules per-
mit appellate courts to perform their function of
reviewing a conviction with the aid of counsel."'
What then appears to be a conflict between
courts allowing the Anders briefs and those requir-
ing appellate briefs is only two different rules to
enforce the obligation of advocacy. The real'con-
flict in the case law has developed as a result of
the failure of some courts to see that the appellate
courts, rather than lawyers, must administer any
rules. In an attempt to prevent the "Brief Against
the Client," 2 one court has tried to admonish
appointed counsel to imagine that he were being
paid in deciding whether to withdraw." 6 However,
lid. at 343, 482 P.2d at 219-20, 93 Cal. Rptr. at
595-96.
mSee, e.g., People v. Feggans, 67 Cal. 2d 444, 432
P.2d 21, 62 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1967).
usDixon v. State, 284 N.E.2d 102 (Ind. Ct. App.
1972); McClendon v. People, 481 P.2d 715 (Colo.
1971); State v. Gates, 466 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1971);
State v. Cheelester, 26 Utah 2d 300, 488 P.2d 1045
(1971).
124 See notes 108, 109 and 117 supra.
15Suggs v. United States, 391 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
2
6 Id. at 977-78 (appendix).
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such a rule encourages counsel to consider for
himself if the appeal is likely to succeed. Further-
more, the standard ignores the possibility that at
a certain point of lack of probability of success, a
paying client will decline to pursue an appeal.
Even prior to Anders the federal statutory scheme
for indigent appeals had been interpreted as pre-
venting lawyers from deciding who gains access to
review.12 Once a judicial officer has issued a cer-
tificate of probable cause,N the question of whether
to pursue the appeal has ended. The case ought to
be argued in the appellate court on the basis of
any conceivable point in the record.
Lawyers seem peculiarly aware of the fact that
appeals to the indigent are costless and thus from
the indigent's point of view every appeal ought to
be pursued.12 9 Yet, lawyers like to "win" appeals
and may "resent" the suggestion that they are
bound only to make the appellate arguments that
support the defense presented below. Such a re-
quirement on appellate counsel puts in proper
perspective two problems generated by Anders.
The first of these problems is appellate counsel's
obligation when the client pled guilty but has
appealed. Under the proposed analysis, the answer
is a choice between two options dependent upon
the goals of the particular appellate courts. Either
the plea was involuntary in the sense that present
constitutional standards or the state's own stand-
ards were not observed in receiving the plea;1" 0 or
counsel can simply inform the court that there is
no appellate argument to be made because there
was no defense made out below.' The appellate
court must determine which option it prefers. The
first option would be important to an appellate
court seriously interested in scrutinizing plea bar-
gaining with an eye towards some reform. 2 The
" Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958).
w 28 U.S.C.A. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
R.24; Third Cir. R.7B.
129 Hermann, Frivolous Appeals, at 701; A.B.A. PROJ-
ECT ON MINWUH STANDARDS FOR CRIIBNAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS RELATED TO CR m AL APPEALS 63-64
(Approved Draft 1970).
110 See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969);
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969); cf.
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 434 Pa. 423, 253 A.2d 258
(1969) (holding that a psychiatric examination is not
required before plea of guilty is accepted).
1' See, e.g., People v. Barrios, 1 Ill. App. 3d 1029,
274 N.E.2d 662 (1971); People v. Grant, 1 Ill. App. 3d
658, 274 N.E.2d 603 (1971); People v. Bell, 130 E1l.
App. 2d 791, 267 N.E.2d 367 (1971); People v. Carter,
92 Ill. App. 2d 120, 235 N.E.2d 382 (1968); Common-
wealth v. Sparks, 438 Pa. 77, 263 A.2d 414 (1970).
'a National Commission on Goals & Policies of
Criminal Law chaired by Gov. Peterson recommended
second option may be adopted by a court willing
to await federal constitutional developments by,
in effect, forcing the defendant to pursue collateral
attack in both state and federal courts. 3
The other major problem to be noted, especially
in those jurisidictions that disallow the "Anders
Brief," is what appellate counsel should do with
the trial record without any "good" arguments."'
The manner in which appellate courts should
construe this issue is whether counsel below made
out a defense at all. Courts should distinguish two
kinds of cases. One is where appellate counsel
dislikes the arguments or defense strategy pre-
sented at trial or considers them lacking in merit.
The others are situations where apparently no
defense was presented." 5 In the first kinds of cases
appellate courts should force appellate counsel to
be advocates. In the latter cases, appellate counsel
should present a claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel.
Such a claim by appellate counsel should not be
viewed as an occasion for disciplinary action
against trial counsel."' Rather, raising the issue
gives the appellate court an opportunity to scru-
tinize the actual quality of trial counsel. Such
scrutiny by appellate courts is the starting point
of the development of a doctrine of effective assist-
ance of trial counsel based on the obligation to
defend. Until an appellate court has started to
assess the quality of counsel in criminal cases
generally, however, there should be no haste to
develop a new ill-defined constitutional doctrine
of effective assistance.j Also an appellate court
may be achieving functionally what is meant by
"effective assistance" of counsel by enforcing both
eliminating plea bargaining in the next 10 years. The
California supreme court may be indicating a willing-
ness to scrutinize the plea bargaining process. People v.
Martin, 9 Cal. 3d. 687, 511 P.2d 1161, 108 Cal. Rptr.
809 (1973).
13 State v. Borough, 279 Minn. 199 n.2, 156 N.W.
2d 757, 759 n.2 (1968).
mHermann, Frivolous Appeals at 703.
u5 United States v. Camodeo, 367 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.
1966), vacated and remanded, 387 U.S. 575, aff'd, 383
F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1967) (although arguably the govern-
ment's failure to produce a witness was an error but the
error was not preserved by defense counsel).
13 Bazelon, New Gods for Old: "Efficient" Courts in a
Democratic Society, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 653, 671 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Bazelon, Effcient Courts].
"7Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42
U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1973); Bines, Remedying Ineffective
Representation in Criminal Cases: Departure from
Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REv. 927 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Bines, Ineffective Representation].
See also United States v. De Costa, 487 F.2d 1197
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
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an obligation to defend at trial and an obligation
of advocacy on appeal.
Some of the recommendations of the organized
bar are really contrary to the underlying principles
of Anders. The suggestion that counsel can waive
oral argument if the appeal is not meritorious m
will encourage lawyers to effectuate that which a
unanimous court condemned in Entsminger-an
inadequate appeal. If oral argument is not neces-
sary, court rules can accommodate this problem
by placing the case on a summary calendar."' In
this manner the court makes the basic decision of
access to appellate review and the quality of that
review.
TI. TERMINATING REVIEW AND "SPEEDY
DISPOSITIONS" Or CRIMINAL APPEALS
While the principle of advocacy applies equally
to federal and state cases, its application in federal
cases raises three significant issues not clearly dis-
cernible in an examination of state court response
to Anders. The review function of federal courts
in criminal law differs significantly from that func-
tion in state courts. When the federal court, as a
habeas corpus court, reviews a state conviction,
the court may need to consider the previous oppor-
tunities for review.14 Second, since the origins of
w Waiver of oral argument and submission of a
brief was proposed by the ABA Advisory Committee on
Sentencing and Review. The Full House of Delegates
rejected the Advisory Committee's draft on this point.
Hermann, Frivolous Appeals at 703 n.12. However, such
a route is suggested for appeals without issues of sub-
stance as distinguished from frivolous appeals. ABA
PROJECT ON M UM STANDARDS FOR Cnm'AL
JUsTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO CamnNAL APPEALS
5 (Approved draft 1970) § 3.2 b(ii) provides:
If the client wishes to proceed it is better for counsel
to present the case, so long as his advocacy does
not involve deception or misleading the court.
After preparing and filing a brief on behalf of the
client, counsel may appropriately suggest that the
case be submitted on briefs or request permission
to withdraw, (underlining added to tentative draft).
See also commentary, Id. at 6.
39 Fifth Cir. Rule 18; Third Cir. Rule 12(e). See also
NLRB v. Local No. 42, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost In-
sulators & Asbestos Wkrs., 476 F.2d 275 (3d Cir.
1973); Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Cas. Co. of
N.Y., 431 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1970); Murphy v. Houma
Well Serv., 409 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1969); Huth v. S.
Pac. Co., 417 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1969) (summary dis-
position without oral argument). The Supreme Court
has denied certiorari to review the fifth and fourth
circuit screening procedures. United States v. Ambers,
416 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1039
(1970); In re Louisiana Loan & Thrift Corp., 416 F.2d
898 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub nom. Holohan v.
Reynolds, 397 U.S. 912 (1970); Pluchino v. United
States, 410 U.S. 958 (1973) (cert. denied).
140 Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack
the doctrines of right to counsel and access to re-
view are in the federal constitution, innovations in
the area are likely to be matters of federal law. A
disastrous effect of the failure to analyze Anaers
for federal courts may be an attempt to debate and
decide issues which will prove non-productive.
Third, federal courts are already equipped with
the resources, in terms of personnel and functional
definitions, that make them particularly appropri-
ate for a study of the functions of appellate courts.
Because of recent legislation authorizing a research
function as part of the federal appellate courts,14'
these courts are uniquely situated to ask and
answer questions about the relationship of counsel
and the review function in criminal law.
A. Advocacy in Federal Courts
The difference in review function of federal and
state courts in criminal law cannot be described
merely in terms of relative breadth. Federal courts
review not only federal criminal convictions but
also state criminal convictions after state appel-
late review has determined that conviction and
confinement of the individual is prima facie legiti-
mate. As to the latter function of reviewing state
convictions, the convicted individual can invoke
federal judicial process of review without a law-
yer.1 2 Also, federal courts have increased access
to review through liberalized pleading for state
prisoners1  and liberal construction of the federal
habeus corpus statute.1 " At the same time the
courts have developed "screening devices" to limit
access to review. 4' An often suggested solution to
unlimited access is to appoint a lawyer for the pro
se litigant in federal court.'46 However well-mean-
ing the suggestion, if adopted, lawyers will become
the screeners or the deniers of access to review.
on Criminal Jvdgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 142 (1970).
[hereinafter cited as Friendly Collateral Attack].
'"28 U.S.C. §§ 620-29 (190) (Federal Judicial Cen-
ter).
'42 See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
4 Cf. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
'"Townsend v. Sam, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
116 Note, Screening of Criminal Cases in the Federal
Courts of Appeals: Practice and Proposals, 73 CoLum.
L. REv. 77 (1973). See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (3) (1970)
which authorized district courts to use United States
magistrates to screen post-conviction applications.
"The additional duties authorized by rule may include,
but are not restricted to... (3) preliminary review of
applications for post trial relief made by individuals
convicted of criminal offenses .... "146 But see Zeigler & Hermann, The Invisible Litigant:
An Inside View of Pro Se Litigation in the Federal Courts,
47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 157, 250 (1972).
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The federal courts must recognize that it is
better for state prisoners to have access to federal
review of a conviction without lawyers. In the
first place if the convicted person has proceeded
at trial and at least one appeal with a lawyer, he
is hoping to obtain relief where the combined
efforts of two lawyers have failedj'7 Second, if
the petition lacks merit, it is the federal court's
responsibility to say so and make the difficult
determination of when a given piece of criminal
litigation is final. The federal courts must develop
legal doctrines that limit access in order to prevent
lawyers from making the determination of when
criminal litigation is final14 Finally, the federal
court's ability to make the determination of final-
ity will be a function of its ability to enforce the
obligation of advocacy in the state courts.
149
In one sense the federal courts, in their review
of criminal convictions, have created the "law
explosion" or the emphasis on "legality"' 50 in
criminal law. And as the source of any further
doctrinal developments on access to review or
counsel in the criminal law, the federal courts are
in the position to clarify the emerging issues of
delivery of legal services in the criminal process.
Foremost in this clarification should be an in-
sistence that the provision of counsel in the crim-
inal process is a "juridical right" as opposed to a
"social welfare right." 151 Cast as a juridical right,
counsel is required whenever the state seeks to
impose its criminal label through prosecution. After
the prosecution the individual is entitled to at
least one review with a lawyer to insure the legiti-
1
47 Cf. United States v. O'Clair, 451 F.2d 485, 486
(1st Cir. 1971) (holding that appellant is not entitled
to appointment of different counsel who presumably
would be willing to serve as mouthpiece for petitioners
own arguments).
' Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250,
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring); See also Friendly,
Collateral Attack.
149 Cf. IPreiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
'5 0 PAcxan, LnTS at 232-36.
M Cappelletti & Gordley, Legal Aid: Modern Themes
and Variations, 24 STAN. L. REv. 347 (1972). The au-
thors suggest that in the nineteenth century legal aid
was a combination of juridical right and charity. Id.
at 387. Legal aid as a juridical right is also present in
20th century schemes. One feature of legal aid as a
juridical right is its emphasis on individual rights and
responsiblities. As contrasted with the social welfare
approach, a program of aid as a juridical right "only
coincidentally attacks problems that transcend indi-
vidual interests or capacities." Id. at 393. Cf. E.
FpcmsEN, E. GALLAS & N. GALLAS, MANAGING THE
CoURTs 49 (N.Y. 1971); Burger, Counsel for the Prose-
cution and Defense-Their Roles under the Minimum
Standards, 8 Am. CRmn. L.Q. 2,3 (1969).
macy of state control. Such a delineation is dis-
tinct from the position of some commentators and
judges who see the right to counsel and access cases
as part of a social welfare movement.'1 2
Once the constitutional doctrines of counsel and
access are seen as juridical rights or matters of
judicial principles and rules, federal courts are in
the position to eradicate the differential standards
between retained and appointed counsel.ln If
there is one constitutional standard of performance
of counsel, judicial decisions will be dealing di-
rectly with the troublesome questions of who gets
what kind of legal services in the criminal process.
The line of "indigency" is not a static economic
level that a rule establishes. For instance, depend-
ing upon one's use of resources for trial counsel,
one may be indigent for purposes of appeal. Courts
should not shrink from these troublesome issues
of the marginal defendants, i.e. those who do not
meet standards of indigency but cannot afford full
access to review.lN
Addressing the problems does not mean the
courts would resolve every issue in terms of
whether or not the decision favors the indigent.
Instead the courts should be aware of the alloca-
tive effect of any of its decisions. For example, the
unresolved issue of whether it is permissible to
require some form of repayment from those who
have had counsel appointed in criminal cases is a
much broader issue than indigency.155 Appointing
counsel with little inquiry into true ability to pay
may make counsel more readily available to all
those charged with crimes. Bearing in mind that
this service, at apparent zero cost to the defendant,
is a cost that must be born by someone, a court
might determine that a system of recoupment of
some of the funds is permissible. The degree to
152E.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 814 (1963);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See also Bazelon,
The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. Cm. L. Rv.
1 (1973); Pye, The Administration of Criminal Justice,
66 CoLum. L. Rnv. 286, 301-03 (1966).
15- Compare West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026 (5th
Cir. 1973) (holding the standard of effectiveness of
retained counsel is the same standard as that for ap-
pointed counsel) with United States ex rel. O'Brien v.
Maroney, 423 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1970) (holding there is
a different standard for retained counsel). See genrally
Bines, Ineffective Representation at 982.
1 D. OAKs & W. LErw", A CumuNAL JusTIcE
SYsTEM AND TH INDIGENT 150-51 (1968).
195 James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972). As this
article was about to go to print, the Court upheld a
state statute requiring the convicted indigent defendant
to repay the cost of counsel when he became financially
able. Fuller v. Oregon, - U.S. _, 94 S.Ct. 2116 (1974).
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which some persons might forego counsel because
of possible recoupment might be balanced by others
using the appointed system when their "indigency"
is in doubt. The foregoing of counsel by some and
the appointing of counsel where indigency is un-
certain would be desirable if the court thought the
lawyers operating under its appointive system were
better than the average private attorney engaged
in criminal practice.
The presence of lawyers throughout the criminal
process has begun to generate new kinds of public
policy issues.156 What kinds of controls will most
likely make the decision-making of lawyers con-
form to the constitutional purposes for requiring
their presence? Where the appellate court is at-
tempting to control a large public defender or-
ganization, the court would be trying to control a
bureaucracy, not a disparate group of individual
lawyers. Mixed systems of appointed private
lawyers and public defenders are simply variations
on this theme?7 Providing funds for counsel and
the organization of the public defender is a legis-
lative response to the judicial creation of the re-
quirement of counsel in the criminal process5s
The federal appellate court is in a unique posi-
tion to recognize the existence of the new institu-
tion of counsel. As an appellate court it performs
the function of asking questions of itself and other
agencies about the criminal law.159 Congress has
strengthened this role by allowing for the appoint-
ment of a court executive, 160 one of whose functions
is to engage in research."' Viewing the federal
156 John v Hurt, 489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam) (holding that there is a qualified judicial
immunity for the public defender); Wallace v. Kern,
481 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1973), cert denied,U.S.-., 94 S.
Ct. 879 (1974) (holding that the public defender as an
association does not act under color of state law for the
purposes of an injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970)). The second circuit case may involve a more
complex issue since the district court judge had ordered
a certain case load for the legal aid attorneys in New
York City; Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
1&718 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (1970). Cf. D. OAXs & W.
Lxm=A, CRunNAL JusTrcE SYSTEM AD T E INDIGENT
at 165.
'
1 See, United States v. Thompson, 361 F. Supp. 879
(D.D.C. 1973). Cf. In re Defender Association, 13
Cms. L. REP. 2405 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 7/2/73) (upholding
city of Philadelphia appointments to board of Defender
Association which is in part run with city funds).
'59Bazelon, Efficient Courts at 655.
o 28 U.S.C. § 332(e) (1970).
1128U.S.C. §332(e) (6) & (7) provides that the
court executives' duties may include: "Conducting
studies relating to the business and administration of
court's review function in its broadest sense creates
a new task for the court executive. He must first
distinguish the unique features of criminal litiga-
tion in federal courts before he develops overall
court management policies.162 Professor Packer's
thesis about the connection of counsel and review
should be the starting point of his research en-
deavors. As the official researcher, the executive
must translate Packer's thesis into testable hy-
potheses that relate his management recommenda-
tions to the goal of enforcing the obligation of
advocacy. Any given federal circuit, as well as the
circuits together,162 provide the laboratory for
testing the probable impact of some legal innova-
tions.
The series of questions that a court executive
might ask could begin with a question of court
management that leads to larger issues of delivery
of legal services. As to simple methods of docketing
cases, the executive might ask if the cases are
categorized in such a way that the various review
functions of federal courts can be studied sepa-
rately and integrally. 1'4 As to the usual function
of direct review of criminal convictions, the execu-
tive might ask if various federal districts within
the circuit have different systems of providing
counsel 6 If so, a basis of comparison exists for
testing by some criteria the best way of supplying
counsel at trial and on direct appeal. If, for in-
stance, over a large number of cases it were found
that appeals from one federal district took longer,
or resulted in more reversals than appeals from
another district, a host of other questions are now
ready to be addressed. Was the system of appoint-
ing counsel on appeal the same for cases in both
districts? Or does the make-up and complexion of
the courts within the circuit ... " and "Collecting,
compiling, and analyzing statistical data...."
112For a characterization of the court executive as
manager and a description of managerial duties see
Statement of Ernest Frieson, Jr., Hearings on a Bill to
Provide for the Appointment of an Administrator of the
Courts for Each Judicial Circuit before the Senate Sub-
comm. on Improvements in Jrudicial Machinery of the
Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., July
25, 1968, p. 290. See also Statement of Edward C.
Gallas, Id. at 303 (research projects of the administra-
tor).
1- 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1970) (section on Judicial Con-
ference of the United States includes provision for
making comprehensive survey of U.S. courts).
114 Cf. Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures
in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1973 WASH.
U.L.Q. 257, 277-79 (1973) (identifying habeas corpus
actions and distinguishing them from other civil ac-
tions).
16518 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (1970).
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the bar in each district explain the difference?
What other research would be appropriate in the
district courts to clarify the problem? And finally,
what kinds of recommendations, e.g., changes in
rules of appellate procedure versus the standards
for effective assistance of counsel are appropriate
given the kind of research being undertaken?0 6
Through a set of similar questions the court
executive should compare the expenditure of ap-
pellate resources on direct federal criminal appeals
to the expenditure of resources in collateral review
of state convictions. 1'6 Once again the problem
might start with a simple directive to change the
docketing of cases so that the state of origin of a
case on collateral attack is readily identifiable.
More pertinent questions might go to the nature
of direct review of criminal cases and collateral
review in the states in the circuit. For instance,
are there significant differences in the quantity and
quality of federal review required in states with
elaborate post-conviction statutes'68 as compared
with those without such provisions? One might
assume that the state without an elaborate col-
lateral review mechanism generates more work for
federal courts. But if the state with a minimum
level of collateral review has an effective system
of appeals and an effective public defender system,
the absence of presence of elaborate state col-
lateral attack procedures may not be significant' 69
Such a result would support the overall thesis of
this article that the time spent on review of crim-
inal convictions in federal courts is a function of
counsel at the original trial, effectiveness of coun-
sel on appeal, and thus the effectiveness of appel-
late courts.
A more sophisticated study might include a
study of the work of another arm of some federal
appeals court, the pro se clerk. The executive might
examine what happens to those cases that are
screened out by the pro se clerk. As the official
16 Statistics will affect the constitutional outcome of
cases. Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
167 Actions taken under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) are
not discussed in the article but the analysis would be
generally applicable.
68 It might be useful to compare the outcome of
federal cases originating in a state like New Jersey
which has only one appeal as a matter of right, see N.J.
Rules Governing Criminal Practice, Rule 3:22-3, with
the outcome of cases originating in Pennsylvania which
provides counselled collateral attacks on the criminal
judgment. See Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 426 Pa.
226, 232 A.2d 629 (1967).
169 New Jersey appellate courts may have more means
of insuring vigorous appeals through its inherent rule-
making power. E. FIESE:N, E. GAILAs, & N. GALLAS,
MANAGING TH CouRTs at 31-35.
researcher, the executive must present his pro-
posed research to the judicial council for pre-
research review. His ability to design his research
in terms of legal doctrines will increase his impact.
Furthermore, preview of research by the court
before it is undertaken will help to determine the
scope of the executive's recommendations. For
reasons peculiar to the judges, the court might
determine that modification of rules might be an
appropriate goal of research but that legal doc-
trines as to effective assistance of counsel are
not."0 Realistically, as an arm of the court, the
executive can only be as innovative as the par-
ticular federal circuit court of appeals that he
serves. But his overall performance as court mana-
ger will be improved if he recognizes the unique
features of criminal law in his policy formulations.
B. "Speedy Dispositions" of Criminal Appeals
Research, including the process of posing and
resolving questions, takes time during a period
when expediting or speeding up the work of appel-
late courts is assumed to be the most important
common goal. One answer to this objection is to
simply postulate that time is a commodity input
of the appellate courts' efficient output in criminal
law. Deciding how long criminal appeals take will
ultimately require allocative decisions by appel-
late courts, but a complete answer must go further.
First, the courts must realize that lawyers and
judges are more likely to define the issue of "time"
as the issue of "delay." Given the status of the
absence of delay in trial as the fundamental right
to a speedy trial,' lawyers have every incentive
to argue that delay on appeal is some type of
"fundamental individual interest," a violation of
which would entitle defendants to certain remedies
from the appellate courts. This tendency will be
reinforced by the Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncement that the only remedy available for
denial of a speedy trial is dismissal of the indict-
ment.' If this reasoning by analogylS approach
For reasons peculiar to the judges, they may not
want to authorize research aimed at modifications of
difficult constitutional issues involving complex value
judgments. See, e.g., Burchard, Lawyers, Political Sci-
entists, Sociologists-and Concealed Microphones, 23 Am.
SocsiooGicA Rlv. 686, 687 in J. KATZ, EXPEIMEN-
TATiON WIm HumIA B=GS 103 (N.Y. 1972).
"7 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); Dickey v.
Florida, 397 U.S. 30 (1970).
1
7 Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
"' E.g., Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts
of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and
the National Law, 82 HlAv. L. REv. 542, 575-76 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Carrington, Crowded Dockets].
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to the appellate process is adopted, the problem
for research will be defined as one of "delay." 174
The solutions proposed will all be similarly aimed
at eliminating the problem of "delay" or "undue
delay" that is harmful to some assumed proper
functioning of appellate courts.17
However, viewing the issue broadly in terms of
the different functions of trial and appeals in crim-
inal law, time performs different functions in the
two aspects of criminal adjudication. At least one
member of the Supreme Court has indicated that
the constitutional delay analysis in criminal trials
is not applicable to the appellate process. 17 This
distinction is of constitutional significance because
delay at trial interferes with the overall presump-
tion of innocence, 77 which is part of the due process
analysis of a fair trial. As such, given a particular
theory of due process of law, a concept of delay of
trial might be integrated into the notion of a right
to defend.378
Time can be defined in terms of appellate func-
tions in criminal law. Such a definition requires
that the legal presumption for an appellate court
analysis of the effect of time is the reverse of that
of the trial court in criminal law. Rather than
assume that a person is innocent, the appellate
court is entitled to assume he is guilty. Therefore,
the primary question for appellate courts is whether
the convicted appellant has been rightfully con-
victed and is legitimately under the control of
government officials. Such an articulation of the
issue clarifies the meaning of legality of guilt de-
termination in the new emphasis on review of
criminal convictions. Furthermore, such an em-
phasis on legality in review determinations means
174 ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO CpIMNAL APPEALS
3 (1970); Christian, Delay in Criminal Appeals, A
Functional Analysis of One Court's Work, 23 STAN. L.
REv. 676 (1971); Fleming, The Law's Delay: The
Dragon Slain Friday Breathes Fire Again Monday, 32
PUBLIC INTREST 13 (1973); Scwab & Geddes, Ex-
pediting Disposition of Criminal Appeals in Oregon, 51
ORE. L. REv. 650 (1972). Comment, Appellate Delay in
Criminal Cases, 2 Ams. CRiu. L.Q. 150 (1964); Note,
Screening of Criminal Cases in the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 73 CoLum. L. REv. 77 (1973).
17I5d.
176Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 43 n.4 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
7 See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. at 41 (Brennan,
J., concurring): "The evils at which the clause is di-
rected are readily identified. It is intended to spare an
accused those penalties and disabilities-incompatible
with the presumption of innocence-that may spring
from delay in the criminal process." Cf. Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. at 527 and n.27; In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970).
'7 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522-30 (1972).
that appellate courts sometimes pursue goals of
the criminal law that have nothing to do with the
individual litigant before it.
The alleged relationship between "delay" in
criminal appeal dispositions and the interference
with other goals of criminal law is minimized by
determining that the legality of the guilt deter-
mination is to be viewed as the major function
of criminal appeals. For instance, it is often as-
serted that delay in appellate disposition "dilutes
deterrence or interferes with whatever rehabilita-
tive treatment that may be available." 79 The
assertion is based on two unspoken assumptions
about how the multiple goals of the criminal law
are pursued. First, the statement assumes im-
plicitly that review of a criminal conviction does
not further some important goals of criminal law.
In this regard the assertion ignores the fact that
criminal adjudication, including appellate review,
is the manner in which the values of the criminal
law are articulated? 80 Second, the statement as-
sumes that whatever penal policy is compromised
by criminal adjudication is worth more to the
appellate courts than the time required for review.
The latter assumption seems particularly un-
warranted since the lack of appellate review of
sentencing, and thus of penal policy, is what pres-
ently distinguishes sentencing from most other
criminal law decisions, particularly the determina-
tion of guilt. The effect of time spent on criminal
appeals on penal policy under present analysis is
unknown. If appellate courts were to institute
review of sentencing, the supposed trade-off of
penal policy and the review of conviction could
take place in the appellate courts. If the trade-off
became possible, courts would be producing a new
product for the criminal process. Whatever time
the performance of this role required of the appel-
late court would be in production of a different
output. The older product or output of the appel-
late court had required the reviewing of the guilt
determination and the work of investigative agents.
But it is impossible to predict that the total time
spent on criminal appeals will increase or decrease
because of the institution of review of sentencel
Time expended by an appellate court on crim-
inal appeals of all kinds is time taken from other
matters. But distinguishing criminal appeals is
179 Carrington, Crowded Dockets at 576.
180 Palmer, A Model of Criminal Dispositions: An
Alternative to Official Discretion at Sentencing, 62 GEo.
LJ. 1 (1973).
181 But see Hermann, Frivolous Appeals at 720-21.
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useful because it allows for identification of the
options not available for reforming the courts to
make them produce more. Without complete
theoretical justification, the fundamental value
judgment has been made that our criminal process
needs lawyers and review of guilt determinations.m8
Put another way, lawyers at trial and at least one
review of a guilt determination with lawyers are
necessary inputs.
In judging the time element involved in these
decisions of fixed inputs, "indigent appeals" are
not the problem. While "indigents" surely have
every incentive to appeal since appeal comes at
zero cost to them, all defendants have more in-
centives to appeal when the system operates
basically on a trial plus at least one review. Of
course some clients will be deterred by lack of
resources from pursuing some appeals, but in hir-
ing a lawyer's services for a criminal case clients
increasingly purchase a trial plus review and the
opportunity for a re-trial.17 The ability to purchase
the services of an attorney may be an important
variable in assessing the time spent on review. If
a lawyer is paid for his services he may have an
incentive to deliver more than the minimum of a
trial and one appeal. The paid lawyer may seek
more appeals in order to make the paying client
see himself as better off than the non-paying or
indigent defendant. Or the paid lawyer may have
an incentive to make maximum use of the appel-
late process dependent upon his client's resources.
Such incentives may translate into more time
spent upon appeals by paying clients. However,
the costs of invoking the process of review may
not be an important variable in assessing the time
spent on review. The hypothesis might be tested
by comparing those states which place a near zero
monetary cost on invoking the process of review
by providing every convicted person with a tran-
script and charge no fees to those states that im-
pose direct costs in order to invoke the appellate
process2 u
Similarly, the option of increasing sentences for
"frivolous appeals" 18 is probably not available.
Such a method of internalizing some of the costs
182 Hazard, Rationing Justice. It is fixed unless the
Supreme Court will reexamine Gideon.
183The defendant is at least trying to gain the bar-
gaining position of a retrial if not outright acquittal.
114In California, Massachusetts, and Ohio free tran-
scripts are available to all criminal defendants. CAL.
Gov'T CoDE ANN. § 69952 (West, Supp. 1973); MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 278 § 33A (1972) (felonies); Oto Rev.
CODE Tit. 23, §§ 2301.23, 2301.24, 2301.25 (1955).
of appeal to the convicted will lead to the due
process objection that a sentence has been in-
creased solely because of appeal.8 6 While a suc-
cessful appellant litigant could not be punished,
the unsuccessful litigant would. Thus some poten-
tially successful litigants would be deterred from
appealing by such a system. A second objection
would be that punishment would be inflicted by
appellate courts without a legal determination of
the "crime." In this connection, it is significant
that appellate courts have not used their rule
authority to add "damages" to a litigant who pur-
sues a frivolous appeal in criminal cases' 87 By
their language, the rules might be thought to apply
to only civil litigation. Courts would find, were
they to consider the applicability of these rules to
"criminal" cases, that the punishment of even a
fine would have been inflicted without a legal de-
termination of guilt.
The time expended in review of criminal con-
victions becomes a function of defining the prod-
uct of the appellate courts, choosing between the
available options of inputs, and then measuring
the output. The most frequent measure of success
of criminal appeals, reversal rates,18 seems to
ignore the primary function of appellate courts.
The convicted litigant or his lawyer will measure
the output in this manner. The fact of reversal is ir-
relevant to an appellate court, as a lawmaker in
many aspects of criminal law. Surely to the judges
who voted for affirmance, the appeal ended suc-
cessfully. Furthermore, a case that clarifies the
legal issues in a problem area of the law is a suc-
cess for the court.8 9 A self-evaluating appellate
"I Hazard, After the Trial Court-The Realities of
Appellate Review in THE CouxRs, Um B L c AND
LAw ExPLoSION 60, 84 (1965).
1
86 Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973); Stynche-
combe v. Chaffin, 412 U.S. 17 (1973); Colten v. Ken-
tucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711 (1969).
187 See, e.g., Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
R.38. Cf. United States ex rel. Boyd v. Rundle, 437
F.2d 405, 406 (3d Cir. 1970).
'8 Carrington, Crowded Dockets at 578; Haworth,
Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 1973 WAsH. U.L.Q. 257, 309-19
(1973); Hermaun, Frivolous Appeals at 706.
189 United States ex ret. Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d
739 (3d Cir. 1972) (en banc). A 7-2 majority's over-
ruling of its prior panel decision in United States v.
Zeiler, 427 F.2d 130.5 (3d Cir. 1970), is hardly an
example of an appellate failure because there was no
reversal. Of some importance in judging appellate
success may be the fact that two judges in the 3-2-3
majority switched from their own previous position in
Zeiler (Judges Van Dusen and Adams), 461 F.2d at
740, 746. But an equally erroneous criterion would be
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court must develop measurements related to its
institutional function.
The institutional role for federal courts demon-
strates that research aimed at exploring limita-
tions on collateral review is certainly appropriate.
The option of limiting access to this form of review
is thus available. m But any innovation in limiting
federal review by collateral attack must await
some careful analysis. The appellate courts should
also exercise restraint in relying more upon the
necessary inputs-the lawyers at trial and on
appeals-to raise issues for appellate decision-
making. An example of this need for judicial re-
straint is the still debated issue of the insanity
defense. Do lawyers fail to raise the issue as often
as some appellate judges might like because their
clients do not perceive the benefit of such de-
fenses19 or because they ignore an important issue
of law? The issue of insanity may be symbolically
extremely important to appellate courts and legal
scholars because it deals with moral issues in the
criminal law. But the fact that few lawyer-litigants
choose to defend on the basis of insanity and few
appellate advocates raise the issue presents an
important question for the appellate court: is this
an issue of law that remains unresolved because of
legislative unwillingness or inability to answer the
question of why there is an insanity defense? 11 If
the answer is in the affirmative, the appellate court
is starting to articulate its responsibility for the
"justice" output by leaving such an issue for legis-
lative action or inaction. But the courts might
have an input into the legislative decision to act
or not to act by.raising questions about the ad-
ministration of the legislative determination that
a "mad and bad" syndrome can exist within the
law. 93
The issue of "delay" of appellate dispositions in
criminal appeals will be raised in this period of
demands for an efficient judiciary. The appellate
courts must see that all such alleged issues are
really functions of larger and more important
issues. The question of whether "delay" in appel-
that the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the majority
on the point. See Ash v. United States, 413 U.S. 300
(1973).
190 Friendly, Collateral Revkew.
91 Bazelon, E~ffient Courts at 672-73.
In Cf. Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the Insanity De-
fense--Why Not?, 72 YAm L.J. 853 (1963); Goldstein,
The Brawner Rule-Why? or no More Nonsense on Non-
sense in the Criminal Law, Please!, 1973 W7s U.L.Q.
126 (1973).
193 Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 740 (1972).
late dispositions of a criminal appeal is a reason
for granting bail'9 raises the question of the pur-
poses of bail in general. Should the same criteria
be used for bail prior to trial versus bail after trial
pending appeal? A great degree of confidence in
the effectiveness or "fairness" of criminal trials
might lead one to argue that no one should be
entitled to bail pending appeal. After all, a system
of money bail starts to raise the issue of "indi-
gency" 199 and those out on bail have no incentive
to stop appealing. If lawyers are to be disciplined
for "delay" in criminal appeals,95 is that because
the lawyers have violated the standard of advocacy
in the jurisdiction in failing to pursue the appeal
expeditiously? If there is delay in state collateral
attack,ln is federal habeas corpus appropriate
because state opportunities to litigate are inade-
quate? If the legislature declares that a certain
appellate decision must be done within a specified
time,18 is an appellate court free to affirm or re-
verse automatically if the time period is violated?
If the government is allowed to appeal certain
decisions, what criteria will be used to determine
that the appeal is for "delay" and what sanctions
follow such a determination? 
199
Time is one of the commodities of input into the
appellate court's output in criminal law of deter-
mining whether the individual is rightfully con-
victed. The appellate courts must insist that the
fixed input of counsel at trial spend its time de-
fending against the charge and that other fixed
input of counsel on appeal spend its time seeking
at least one review based on the defense made out
at trial. Such an approach starts to reward those
appellate lawyers who successfully follow the de-
1' See, e.g., Rivera v. Concepion, 469 F.2d 17 (1st
Cir. 1972). Contra, State ex rel. Mastriani v. Tahash,
277 Minn. 309, 152 N.W.2d 786 (1967) (three year
delay on habeas corpus petition-petitioner serving life
sentence for first degree murder)."I PA=R, Lmnrs at 216-217.
196 United States v. Smith, 436 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir.
1970).
17Duke v. State, __ Ind. , 98 N.E.2d 453 (1973)
(held that 2,J year delay deprived the defendant of a
prompt appeal); Fariss v. Tipps, 463 S.W.2d 176 (Tex.
1971) (held that petitioner is entitled to a speedy pro-
bation revocation hearing). But see Mastriani v. Tahash,
277 Minn. 309, 152 N.W.2d 786 (1967).
1"' See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) & (b) (1970) (federal
recalcitrant witness statute provides that an appeal
from an order of confinement must be disposed of
within thirty days).
199 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (amended 1971) provides in
part: "An appeal by the United States shall He... from
a decision or order... suppressing... evidence ... if
the United States attorney certifies to the district court
that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay.... "
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fense strategy as opposed to those who raise issues
not used in defense of the criminal charge. Award-
ing this type of appellate strategy is necessary
to prevent the institutional defense services from
rationing justice. Without such appellate court
control there exists the possibility that the defender
organizations are trading invisibly time spent on
individual appeals for time on "significant" or
"winning issues." But more important is the need
to examine the impact of the institutional de-
fense counsel in the criminal process to determine
whether criminal appeals are part of the invisible
form of the "bargain model" of the criminal pro-
cess
2 0
200 It may well be that the specialization in the
various stages of a criminal proceeding which is
made possible by the vast volume of cases which
comes to the Voluntary Defender's office promotes
efficiency and provides expert service.... These
twin qualities of the divisions of labor and special-
ization are the pillars of the large modem private
law firm. On the other hand, in such an institu-
tionalized system there are inherent the risks of a
loss of the close confidential relationship between
litigant and counsel and the subordination of an
individual client's interest to the larger interest of
the organization. These risks of course are greater
in the case of indigents for whose clientele there is
no compensating pressure of competition. United
States v. Moore, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (1970).
See also United States ex rel. McCoy v. Rundie,
419 F.2d 118, 119-20 (1969) (Freeman, J., concurring).
Cf. Comment, Client Seroice in a Defender Organization:
The Philadelptia Experience, 117 U. PA. L. Rlv. 448,
468-69 (1969).
Condusion
Legal scholars cannot ignore the demand for
more efficient courts by claiming that law or jus-
tice is not rationed. They must join the debate
on judicial administration by explaining the poli-
cies of the law that create the apparent conflict
with the goal of more efficient courts. This exam-
ination of the implications of the right of counsel
and access to review cases is a portion of the over-
all debate. A second obligation of legal scholarship
is to develop through legal analysis testable hy-
potheses that researchers in other discplines can
use in their decisions about courts and related
institutions. In this regard, it should be noted that
certain kinds of data about the operation of courts
will be gathered because of the legislatively defined
research functions of federal court executives.
Thus, the second goal of this article has been to
offer some suggestions for research that should
enable courts, court administrators, evaluators of
courts, and the providers of counsel in criminal law
to allocate the resources that society is devoting to
criminal law administration. And finally this
article has demonstrated that the alleged problem
of "delay" in at least criminal appeals is a matter
of determining what are the fixed and variable
inputs of the appellate courts' product or function
in criminal law. "Delay" in criminal appeals is a
matter of identifying the variable input of time in
criminal law litigation.
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